Rhode Island College

Digital Commons @ RIC
Faculty Publications

Spring 1997

Carnival and Domination: Pedagogies of Neither
Care Nor Justice
Alexander M. Sidorkin
Rhode Island College, asidorkin@ric.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ric.edu/facultypublications
Part of the Education Commons
Citation
Sidorkin, A. M. (1997). Carnival and domination: Pedagogies of neither care nor justice. Educational Theory, 47(2), 229-238.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5446.1997.00229.x

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ RIC. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an
authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ RIC. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@ric.edu.

Carnival and Domination:
Pedagogies of Neither Care Nor Justice.
There are two alternative projects to overcome domination in education with ethics of justice and
ethics of care.1 I want to look beyond disagreements between the two projects about the essence
of morality. Both these projects, from my point of view, have clear limits. The domination is
mainly a problem of freedom, and ethics deal with a problem of good and evil. In other words, I
suggest that reduction of human evil may reduce domination, but does not free us from it. Other
approaches, like carnival and similar cultural phenomena, would do a better job of overcoming
domination.
Moral discourse has one feature, which is important for me here: the language of good and evil
does not have any intrinsic limits; one can become infinitely good and infinitely evil, at will. The
idea of evil evokes a possibility of its at-will reduction — whether directly in interpersonal
relations, or through social change. If there are practical limits in how good or how evil one may
act, those limits do not belong to the moral realm proper. One cannot become “too good,” so
good, that one’s goodness turns into its antipode. The language of good and evil gravitates
towards absolute ideals of goodness, which may not be possible to achieve, but which ought to
be achieved, if it were possible. The ideal varies enormously from one ethical theory to another,
but its “limitlessness” is the same most everywhere.
The concept of freedom, on the other hand, is inseparable from the notion of limits. Ultimate
freedom is unthinkable, or, rather, it amounts to non-being, to death. “Human limits structure the
human excellencies, and give excellent actions its significance,” as Martha Nussbaum
comments.2 What exactly she means is clear from her example and discussion. Calypso offers
Odysseus to stay with her on the island, to avoid all the future troubles, to become immortal and
ageless.
He is choosing, quite simply, what is his: his own history, the form of a human life and the
possibilities of excellence, love and achievement that inhabit that form... We don't quite
know what it would be for this hero, known for his courage, craft, resourcefulness, and loyal
love to enter into life in which courage would atrophy, in which cunning and resourcefulness
would have little point, since the risks with which they grapple would be removed, and in
which love, insofar as it appears at all, would be very different in shape from the love that
connects man to wife and child in the human world of the poem. The very possibility makes
one uneasy: for where, and who, in such a life, would our hero actually be? Do we wish for
him a good result that involves a transformation so total that he might not remain himself?3
For surely one reason why the choice for transcendence seems unappealing to the reader is
that it would, quite clearly, bring the story to an end... What story would be left, if he made
the other choice? Plato saw the answer clearly: no story at all, but only praises of the
goodness of the good gods and heroes.4
Freedom, in its extreme forms like immortality, ceases to be desirable. I would argue that all
other hypostases of freedom become equally meaningless when taken to their maximum. The
language of freedom contains, if only implicitly, a realization that absolute freedom , even if
achievable, should not be achieved. In other words, ideals of freedom have different role than
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ideals of goodness: in the language of freedom, the movement towards an ideal takes precedent
over the ideal itself. Or, too put it differently, freedom is not a place, but a direction. The
language of morality on the other hand, does not capture the drama of intrinsic limits that come
from the most essential human conditions. Our freedom is being limited by much more than
other people’s evil deeds: by age, illnesses, physical constrains of the world, etc. The world
maybe generally described as a set of limits existing in certain balance with each other. Although
the humanity incessantly tries the limits, these are attempts to make sense of limits rather than to
get rid of them all together.
Why do I think that concept of domination belongs to the language of freedom rather than to the
language of morality? The reason is that complete elimination of domination is not desirable,
even though domination can and should be reduced. A world without all forms of domination, I
argue, will be a non-human world of total disengagement and loneliness.
I will now define domination. Among the whole range of limits that constitute human life, there
are some imposed on us by others; by individuals, by certain groups, and by society. These
limits of human origin constitute the phenomenon of domination. For instance, to say that an
illness dominates one’s life, would be simply a metaphorical expression. Domination implies
some form of human involvement. Yet domination does not necessarily include instances of
evil, of intentional harm. If someone intentionally does harm to me, it may severely hinder my
freedom. But this does not mean that all, or even most limitations of my freedom come from
someone's immoral intentions, even if another human being actually causes the harm. For many
of the bad things that happen to us, there is nobody to blame. Domination is another side of
social association, which is constitutive to human existence.
The domination connotes with power, control, and mastery. When an individual directly benefits
from control and power over another, or has a choice of not having control over another, we may
speak of detrimental domination, the instance of evil. But in the many cases, especially in
educational context, the dominating individual neither seeks nor enjoys his or her dominating
position. The distinction of this sort is quite vague and hard to prove, but seems plausible to me
nevertheless, at least in theory. In some cases the dominating party is not even aware of its
position.
To illustrate the point about unintended domination I will use the story, told in 1949 ”RockingHorse Winner” movie, directed by Anthony Pelissier.5 A boy worries very much because of his
mother’s complains about the lack of money. This is an upper class family, and a viewer
perceives the mother’s complains as false ones, even more so as she has frivolous spending
habits. But for him, and most likely for her, these are real problems. The boy finds a magical
way to predict future winners in horse races, and to earn money for the family. These
premonitions involve exhausting rituals of achieving state of trance. The boy would ride his
rocking horse for hours to get an insight about the future winner. His mother does not know all
these, and does not care where the money comes from. Eventually, after an especially exhausting
attempt to guess the winning in the next race horse, boy gets sick and dies.
The form of domination portrayed in the story is strange and tragic. The mother is just
inattentive to her son’s deep worries. She does not realize what kind of impact her loud
complaints about money make on her son. She causes her son a great deal of suffering, and
ultimately, his death. And yet there is nothing malicious about her. She loves her son, and
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worries about his strange insistence on riding the rocking horse, if only worries too little. I see an
instance of domination here; the mother dominates her son’s life, thereby limiting his freedom,
and causing pain. I see no evil there. Although the mother is tormented with guilt after the boy’s
death, there are no more reasons for guilt, than if, for instance, her car would crash and the boy
gets hurt in the accident.
I want to make clear that the mother dominated her son not only because of her unawareness of
the real situation. The negligence maybe reproached as an action. It is also her whole being, the
very essence of her character that set incredible limits in the boy’s life. In general, being a parent
means that your child cannot walk away from you, and all your soul’s little demons will
dominate the child’s life. Many would agree that there is a certain amount of pain that comes
simply with living. Some of that pain is allocated for children, “an essential myth of childhood
— inevitable pain,” as R. Rodriguez puts it.6 It takes an effort to agree that some inevitable pain
comes from us, parents and teachers.
One may object that my understanding of domination stretches it too far. What is the point in
including unintended or inevitable limitations that we impose on each other into the notion of
domination? Does it make my notion of domination too broad, and therefore, meaningless? Let
us try to think that domination includes only those applications of power that have self-serving,
evil motivation. For one, such a definition would make the notion of domination superfluous.
Why not simply call it evil? If we want to have any positive idea about good or evil, we have to
admit that all other virtues like freedom, beauty, honesty, etc., may include some mixture of
good and evil, or have their moral and immoral sides. If the concept of domination is useful for
anything but plain moral judgment, it should logically include the possibility of both benign and
malignant forms. Saying that domination is always immoral denies any substance to the
concept of domination.
Another reason is of more practical nature. All the oppression in the world goes on under “wedo-it-for-your-own-good” slogan. Anyone from a common wife beater to a nation’s dictator will
deny evil intentions in his deeds. The only way to reduce domination is to argue that even
though your dominance is presumably for the greater good, it still harms the dominated by
depriving him or her of freedom, and therefore should be reduced or eliminated. What I am
saying is that real instances of domination are better challenged with the language of freedom,
than with the language of good and evil. The price of using the language of freedom is that one
has to realize that absolute freedom is undesirable. Therefore, some forms of domination have to
exist.
An unfortunate truth about schools is that they are dominating institutions. Perhaps, all the
institutions are this way, but here is what we know about schools: if successful, they do change
people. Richard Rodriguez in his autobiography writes: "...education is a long, unglamorous,
even demeaning process — a nurturing never natural to the person one was before one entered a
classroom."7 Education, he points out, requires radical self-reformation. Whatever external, or
internal forces make a person to change, the radical self-reformation may not happen without
losses and trade-offs. "No pain — no gain" saying reflects certain essence of education. One
may offer two ways to get around this claim. First, education should happen in the interest of a
child, and therefore, it is not a domination. This simply is not true, because many instances of
true domination that I know occurred with the dominating side being sincerely altruistic. A
second correction may be that if a student is sufficiently involved into educational decisions, it is
3

not a domination. R. Rodriguez’s story suggests that self-domination is still a domination. Selfafflicted loss is still a loss.
People do limit their own freedom all the time. An individual lets one side of his or her
personality dominate others. For instance, a child who chooses to pursue a career of an actor,
will deprive himself from multitude of other possibilities. It is common to believe, that if a child
makes this kind of decision by her- or himself, this would be somehow better, than if his or her
parents, for instance, made that decision. I do not see how this is true. If you take consequences
only, they might be equally damaging whether we brought them on ourselves, or under somebody
else’s influence or pressure. If a child chooses a wrong, ineffective learning approach, it will be
no better from the point of view of consequences, than imposing bad approaches on him or her.
Some children go through school without much pain. The most obvious characterization of
domination in education seems to be a child’s suffering. This is not a true mark. A child may
not feel anything unpleasant at the moment of encounter with dominating adult. For instance,
some children enjoy sexual experiences with adults, which does not make the child molestation
any less dominating activity. Similarly, schooling may be quite pleasant, which does not change
that children are subjected to profound transformation, and partial loss of their potential. One
may object, that child molestation is morally wrong, while schooling is not. Yet I do not want
this difference to obscure the similarity of “invisible” domination.
Children choose different strategies to deal with the dominating side of educational institution.
Rodriguez embraced it, he internalized the pressure, gave himself in fully. This brought him a
spectacular academic success, but also the loss of identity, severed intimate ties with his family.
H. Kohl describes other children, who reject learning altogether, who avoid educational
domination while paying very high price — not learning at all. This strategy of resistance is most
futile, because it is directed not against real, but perceived evil. It aims against domination,
which is not always possible to eliminate.8 A withdrawal from a dominating institution —
physical or just mental — most often ends up with joining some other, maybe more dominating
institution; a school is being exchanged for a street gang, for instance.
The dominating side of education is a particular case of more general feature of the world we all
know. It forces us to make choices, to pay for all gains with some losses. One cannot learn
without reforming one's self, and therefore compromising one's identity.
The physical world is fundamentally singular, which means that it allows only one possibility out
of many to be realized at one time. This is a real root of domination. We are confound and
dominated by others because we share with them a single world, and cannot have it all for
ourselves. The modern Western civilization may be viewed as one great effort to change this
singularity, mostly by multiplying available resources, but also by creating pluralistic
democracies and postmodern philosophies. All these efforts show their clear limits. World
resources remain quite obviously limited. Despite extensive provisions for freedoms of
expression, the law, economy, and politics remain singularly organized in modern democracies.
We still need common laws and policies; market mechanisms are universal throughout the
world. The social world remains largely singular, and therefore dominating. But more than that,
if we give this shared ownership over the world, we will also give up our humanity.
Simple increase of freedom for our children does not reduce domination. S.D.Rosenberg,
H.R.Rosenberg, M.P.Farrel tell a story of one troubled family.9 A conflict between Arthur and
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Nancy, father and daughter, is at center of this family's troubles. The broader movement toward
questioning the parent authority sets the stage for the family struggle. The family narrative
contains several subplots that are mutually contradictory. Arthur is committed to egalitarianism
and personal freedom. So, he was shocked to be accused of being domineering. Nancy felt
subtle pressure to fulfill parents expectations, to read her father’s clues. She had an identity
crisis trying to separate herself from her parents’ expectations. Both children want their father to
set more explicit rules, to take on a role of a father. As one can see, the simplistic approach to
the problem of domination, namely giving children more and more freedoms, does not work,
because it leads to new, more sophisticated forms of domination.
Domination cannot and should not be cured with any amount of care or justice, since limits of the
freedom are built into reality. But the European civilization had developed a different solution: if
reality does not cooperate, create another reality. A carnival, as presented by M. Bakhtin, is a
thousand - year- old tradition of utopian approach to the world. What I am saying is that
inevitability of domination in social world does not mean we should give up on our struggle with
it. I want to acquire better understanding of domination in order to address the problem more
efficiently.
Bakhtin wrote that cultural forms of laughter in effect created second world and a second life
where all medieval people took some part.10 Carnival does not mean total escapism, and failure
to change the reality, but it rests an understanding of how far reality can be changed. Carnival
creates a parallel reality of a folk festivity, of a utopian human community without hunger,
hatred, oppression, social hierarchy, and rigid cultural taboos. The only limitation of this
wonderful world was that it was short-lived. It is interesting to notice that the peak time of
carnival culture falls on the Renaissance period, when some of the most oppressive political
regimes existed. Yet it is possible that the highest achievements of human freedom were made in
16-th century, because the carnival is a break from the kingdom of necessity into the kingdom of
freedom. It is capable of something neither justice nor care can do.
The carnival in some respects is opposite to ethics of care; it is care-free. People do not care
about each other, because the very difference between you and me fades. It implies certain loss
of individuality in favor of chaotic, but united multivoiced body of a carnival. Not-caring results
from utopian bounty. There is no future, no commitments, no worries in the carnival. One does
not watch carnival, according to Bakhtin, but lives it. Carnival is life taken from its regular rut.
Any distance among people is canceled. Free and familiar contact among all people is a unique
for carnival category. A person frees himself from any social role, any conventions of regular
world.11
It is very important to note that the carnival culture needs, so to speak, “the first world” of
official social realities to laugh at. This is why certain stability of social institutions is important
in schools. Some rituals should exist if only to be ridiculed from carnival position.12 Carnival is
not a rebellion; it does not call for an immediate abolishment of social conventions, but it
demonstrates that those conventions are cumbersome and ridiculous, and do not constitute
essential human relations. Bakhtin pointed out very important feature of medieval laughter that
does not apply to most of the modern humor. An ancient laughter was ambivalent. It included
rejection and acceptance, praise and cursing, bringing down and elevating. The carnival made
fun of official institutions, even of God and saints, while it also manifested certain acceptance of
authority and sanctity.
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Some may suggest that carnival is a Middle ages phenomenon, which “died with modernity.”13
Bakhtin seemed to say exactly that, pointing out that carnival gradually recedes from 17th
century on, leaving its traces in a particular literary tradition, and some forms of laughter
culture.14 Bakhtin never examined the reasons of such a change. I think he believed in some
version of a “golden age” theory. Bakhtin himself obviously could not have witnessed the true
medieval carnival, and only knew it through literature and related cultural phenomena. I cannot
make any judgment whether modern forms of carnival and carnival culture are worse or less
impressive than the ancient ones. It may very well be the case that since life of democratic
society has become more and more free, the need for such a strong “vaccine” as big allencompassing carnival has receded as well. At the same time, I maintain that no society can
afford to live in total, utopian freedom permanently, and no form of democracy can free us from
domination. As long as this is true, there is a need for carnival.
But what about education? I will argue that we cannot change dominating nature of education.
No amount of care and justice can do that. I hope this does not sound like suggestion that a
school is not a place to care for children. My concern is that care should not be viewed as the
only project worth pursuing in education. The carnival and third places are other effective tools
in reducing the negative effects of domination without destroying the education. We can create a
level of second reality in schools.
School always included some forms of laughter culture. Bakhtin noted that academia from
Classic times had its own strong stream of laughter culture, where not only Latin grammar, but
also Holy Scriptures were objects of parody.
It is quite difficult sometimes to track down carnival-like situations in contemporary school
descriptions, because most researchers ignore them as too volatile, too unusual and too
unrepresentative for a school culture. Nevertheless I have a belief that every good school
engages into some form of carnival, or maintains its “third places,” which I will define later, or
both. One example comes from a school I have spent considerable time studying in 1987-1990.
Laboratory School #825 in Moscow, a.k.a. Karakovskii School, has its traditional Spring sbor.
The word means just a gathering, something between a retreat and an assembly. Up to two
hundred children and adults go out of town, or isolate themselves some other way. They spend
three or so very intense days (with very little sleep, actually, which helps to boost creativity)
filled with skit-making, fun, serious discussions, some physical work and sport, and games. KTD
, an abbreviation for a collective creative action (kollektivnoe tvorcheskoe delo) generally
describes a primary kind of activity. On its surface, it is skit-making, quite elaborated in some
cases. But the educators and older students attach a specific meaning to it, a meaning sharply
different from simply having fun. In fact, they perceive it as a work, as a duty, as a demanding
service. For an individual, sbor is a spiritual experience more than anything else. Being a part
of some greater whole, a communion, is the goal; skits, arts, planning and organizing, doing
dishes, and even helping the neediest are the means to achieve that goal. Sbor is an independent
non-utilitarian cultural phenomena, as for instance, a theater is. In Karakovskii’s school they say
“to make sbor,” meaning that there are really different degrees of success, and everyone could
feel it.
Just like in carnival described by Bakhtin, sbor’s essence is a universal, all-engulfing laughter.
This type of laughter exists in city crowd, on market place, on city square. It is the laughter of
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the masses, but not only a satire, not the modern understanding of laughter. The carnival
laughter defies the fear by ridiculing gods and authorities, and in such a way makes the world
closer and more familiar. It is also an ambivalent laughter, embracing the new and the old, the
death and the birth, beginning and end.
As Dmitry S. Likhachev et al. commented,
Laughter violates existing connections and meanings. Laughter reveals the senselessness
and absurdity of existing in the social world relations [...] However, laughter also has a
certain productive element – if only in the world of imagination. Laughter destroys, but also
creates something of its own, that is a world of broken relationships, a world of absurdity and
illogical relations, a world of freedom from conventions and therefore a desirable and
careless one [...] In its own sphere, laughter restores human contacts which are distorted in
the other social sphere, because laughing people are ‘conspirators’ of a kind, who see and
understand something they neither saw or understood before, or something others cannot see
and understand.”15
This characteristic can be fully applied to sbor. Its language is the language of laughter, and
laughter possesses destructive power. Sbor profoundly shakes all conventions of social life. For
example, the heretofore all-powerful principal acts as a little kid, teachers give up their
responsibilities, letting students run their own affairs. General excitement and exhaustion bring
adults and students alike to most unusual and free encounters among themselves.
I think that the whole school organization, its culture and activities exist for these brief moments
of freedom that every kid is given an opportunity to live through. However, carnival has
profound impact on the social organization of the school. Karakovskii’s sbor takes less than one
per cent of the year, but is undeniably the most important event of the school year. In energizes
the whole school community, brings about a peculiar feeling of liberation and connectedness.
The sbor symbolizes everything dear to the school community; it has a power to cancel troubles,
smooth conflicts, and put everything into some perspective.
The concept of carnival applied towards school describes a particular rhythm of school life: an
everyday phase is followed by a carnival phase. Again, the utopia should be kept limited in time
or/and space. My ideal is a school that lives two distinctive modes of life: one is somewhat
conservative, with a complex web of traditions, rules, and roles, the life of everyday learning; and
second is life of carnival, where traditions, rules and roles are broken, reversed, and laughed at.
In addition such a school would include some hangout places with no or minimal adult
supervision, but still within the orbit of the school culture.
I suggest that what C. Lasch calls “third places” represents essentially the same utopian project,
although limited within space, not time. The term actually belongs to R. Oldenburg, who coined
it to distinguish informal hangouts from large, highly structured organizations, on the one hand,
and from families and other small groups, on the other.16
The third places are taverns,
coffeehouses, beer gardens and pubs of a particular kind, where one is known in an informal way.
Their primary function is not an alcohol consumption, but conversation, the essence of civic life,
as Lasch puts it. He claims that the third places sustain democracy; they sort of prepare a person
for political life. While this might be true at a certain degree, the main purpose of the third
places from my point of view is to create an alternative, utopian reality; to take people’s lives out
of singularity of their jobs, families, and politics into world of fantasies, loitering, and blathering.
7

It just makes people happier, and happy people eventually make better citizens. But most
important, the strangers may enter the realm of freedom in this provoking atmosphere of the third
place. McLaughlin et al.17 portray how “third places” can function as substitutes for carnival in
educational institutions. All six successful youth organizations they studied, have special time,
and sometimes special places for “just hanging out.” This is not trivial matter of having some fun
time. The “third places” in schools may play an important role in conditioning dialogue. In fact,
some forms of extra-curricular activities of drama, music, sports, journalism, etc., may be
successful because they share some traits of “third places.” The third places do not only provide
social engagement, but also disengagement, retreat into utopian world. A democracy, as any
other society needs people not to take it too seriously. A society needs a utopian outlet that can
provide people with what real social world cannot provide with — freedom.
One may object that third places have their own dangers, and their own forms of domination.
Indeed, teenagers’ hangouts may be quite dangerous and sometimes tend to develop gang-like
oppressive structures. R. Oldenburg may be criticized for some idealization of the third places in
his book.18 Third places as well as carnivals may turn wild, violent and inhuman. I could say
only two things in reply. First, I never argued that freedom always goes hand to hand with
morality; the opposite claim was mine. Freedom, even in its utopian form implies risk. And
second, third places are not equivalent of big city streets; these are not jungle, but small islands
of utopia. They have some rules of the game, just like carnivals develop their own traditions and
languages. Yet both carnival and third places are completely voluntary, and as soon as they
begin to impose undue burden on freedom, people leave them.
Carnival and third places are situations that deliberately reap the social fabric of a school. They
introduce special time and space which invites instances of freedom, but do not guarantee such
instances. Carnival may only take relatively short time; third places may look like insignificant
auxiliary fixture on the school landscape. Yet I believe they should be paid a very serious
attention by educators. If one takes seriously a preposition that freedom is important for human
existence, than carnival and third places should be at the center of attention of school
organization.
The fine art of living includes, but goes well beyond being a moral person. It also requires an
ability to escape into the world where morality, along with realities of everyday life, is irrelevant.
We cannot be happy relying on morality alone. Or, putting it differently, we cannot describe a
good life only in terms of moral language. Education should reflect this fact, and place carnival
and third places into the orbit of educational thought and practice.
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